
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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

## Situation in Laos

A Hanoi broadcast of 21 August, attributed to a spokesman of Laos' Communist front Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ) party, called for the creation of a coalition government with Communist participation, the realignment of Laos' pro-Western foreign policy, and a return to the privileged position secured through the negotiations between the Communists and the royal government which culminated in the unification settlement of November 1957. By taking this extreme position, the NLHZ is creating a climate in which its proscription as a political party is almost inevitable. Its line also suggests that the NLHZ is preparing to abandon legal political activity in favor of guerrilla warfare.

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Reports point to intensified Communist partisan operations in northern Laos, especially in Sam Neua Province and areas of eastern Luang Prabang Province adjacent to Sam Neua. The press states that infiltration in Vientiane Province has forced the government to abandon several posts. The scale of operations appears to be smaller than is suggested by the reports, however.

North Vietnam has markedly increased its accusations that South Vietnam is actively involved in the Laotian crisis, suggesting concern over the possibility that Saigon has secretly agreed to give military aid to Laos. Specifically Hanoi accuses Saigon of training anti-Communist terrorists for the Laotian Government and sending advisers to help the army, and claims that a decision now has been reached to dispatch troops from South Vietnam. At the very least Hanoi probably is worried that Saigon will utilize the present crisis to increase its influence in Laos.

In another development, has reported rumors circulating in Hanoi that Premier and Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong left North Vietnam for Communist China around 17 August to meet President Ho Chi Minh, who has been in China since early August, and to confer with Peiping's leaders about the Laotian situation. Such action would indicate the Communists' pressing need for close policy coordination at this time.

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| III. THE WEST  |      |
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| Paris Shows No Signstof Changing Algerian Program  |      |
| President de Gaulle told UN Secretary General Hammar-skjold on 31 July that he has no definite plan for a "final solution," of the Algerian question. He said he was willing to accept whatever solution "evolved" as long as it was based on a "democratic" decision. He ruled out any negotiations on political matters with Provisional Algerian Republic Premier Abbas, explaining that Abbas has no mandate to represent the Algerians and is too weak to rule them if given an opportunity. De Gaulle said he had made his policy clear and saw no reason to restate it. |      |
| The French cabinet is scheduled to review the Algerian ques-   |      |
| tion 26 August, the day before De Gaulle leaves for a three-<br>day visit to the area.   | 25X1 |
| The section band took a much tougher:  |      |
| Premier Debré, on the other hand, took a much tougher line in his conversation with Hammarskjold. He stated that if the UN General Assembly interfered with France on Algeria, France might have to "cease its cooperation" with the General Assembly. Hammarskjold understood that the threatened walkout would not extend to the Security Council or the UN as a whole.  |      |
| Recently there have been indications that Paris intends to pre-  |      |
| pare a strong case for the UN debate. Such an approach would undoubtedly lead to renewed insistence that France's allies give their full support.  | 25X1 |
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## Complete Impasse Reached in British-Maldivian Relations

Relations between Britain and the Maldives, a British-protected sultanate 400 miles southwest of Ceylon, have reached an impasse over the terms governing Britain's use of the air base under construction on Gan Island. This base, a key RAF staging post and an important link between the Middle East-African area and Singapore-Australia, is located in Addu Atoll, one of the three southern atolls which were taken over by a secession-ist movement in March.

Two of the three atolls were recaptured in early August, and the British now have informed the Maldivian Government that they are prepared to resist by force any effort to recapture Addu Atoll from the rebels, who provide labor on the air base. A 50-man RAF detachment from Aden is replacing a 100-man army contingent flown in from Singapore in early August when local British officials feared trouble. The Maldivian Government, which earlier charged Britain with instigating the revolt, has rebuffed British offers of mediation, and the prime minister has refused to negotiate further about the base.

ter has refused to negotiate further about the base.

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## THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

